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Abstract—As German TSOs are faced with the threat of north-
south transmission line overloading, the option of a national 
bidding zone reconfiguration in the form of a separate northern 
and southern bidding zone is investigated. By imposing a limit on 
north-south transactions during market clearing, less redispatch 
actions are necessary afterwards, as such resulting in more 
efficient congestion management. However, through market 
coupling, a national bidding zone reconfiguration also has an 
impact on neighbouring electricity markets. This paper analyzes 
the altered interactions between electricity markets caused by the 
introduction of two German prices zones by means of a cost-
minimizing dispatch model. Besides modifying the market 
outcome within Germany, this market design change also impacts 
consumers and producers in other European countries. 
Therefore, a national bidding zone reconfiguration should always 
be analyzed in a European wide context. 
Index Terms—Available Transfer Capacities, bidding zones, 
congestion management, electricity markets, market coupling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, European countries focused on self-
sufficiency in terms of power supply. Developing the internal 
transmission network was prioritized over the development of 
interconnection capacity. Consequently, the current European 
power system is operated based on a zonal pricing mechanism 
in accordance with national borders. Zonal pricing is a 
simplification of the theoretically preferred approach of nodal 
pricing, where locational marginal prices (LMPs) are 
determined for each separate node of the network [1]–[4]. 
Under zonal pricing, nodes are aggregated into zones, 
disregarding internal network constraints. 
A crucial assumption of zonal pricing though is that 
network capacity bottlenecks coincide with zonal borders [5]. 
Hence, internal congestion inside a bidding zone is assumed 
insignificant. However, two important trends challenge the 
present zonal configuration in Europe. Intensified cross-border 
trade and the rising share of renewable energy sources result in 
an increasing amount of volatile and unpredictable power flows 
on the transmission network. Therefore, internal congestion 
occurs more commonly, increasingly demanding for redispatch 
actions by the Transmission System Operator (TSO). German 
TSOs frequently face the threat of north-south transmission line 
overloading, caused by the spatial imbalance between supply 
and demand [6]. A significant share of renewables integration 
occurs in the north, compared to the south of Germany. The 
                                                          
1 Based on data from information platform Netztransparanz: 
https://www.netztransparenz.de/de/Redispatch.htm 
total volume of redispatch actions in Germany increased by 
160% in 2015 compared to 20141. As an alternative to an 
elevated redispatch cost, the introduction of additional price 
zones in the form of one northern and one southern zone is 
investigated in order to reduce pressure on the current German 
electricity system. 
This paper implements a cost-minimizing dispatch model to 
investigate the implications of a national bidding zone 
reconfiguration in a European-wide context. One uniform 
German bidding zone is compared to a market design with two 
German price zones. Because of market coupling, a national 
bidding zone reconfiguration also influences market outcomes 
in other European countries. More specifically, this paper 
highlights to which extent the split-up of the German electricity 
market alters bilateral interactions between European electricity 
markets. The modified market outcome in Germany is 
analyzed, as well as the implications for consumers and 
producers in other European countries. 
Section II provides an overview of the literature on 
congestion management and explains why the introduction of 
additional bidding zones leads to more efficient congestion 
management. Section III elaborates on the research method, 
sequentially describing the implemented spot market model and 
the used input data. Obtained results are presented in section 
IV. Section V concludes. 
II. CONGESTION MANGEMENT 
The transmission network impacts the operation of a power 
system. While several transmission constraints can be 
distinguished, capacity constraints occupy a prominent place in 
literature. These constraints limit the electric power that can be 
transported between any two points in the grid. As a result, 
congestion – a situation in which the electricity network cannot 
accommodate all scheduled transactions – may occur [7]. 
Congestion management can be defined as all actions taken to 
avoid or relieve congestions in the electricity grid [8]. Deterrent 
(ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) congestion management 
techniques can be distinguished [9]. While the former attempt 
to schedule generation prior to operation in such a way as to 
avoid congestion, corrective techniques influence generation at 
the time of operation to relieve congestion. Deterrent 
congestion management techniques can be classified according 
to a nodal and zonal pricing mechanism. 
 
 
A.  Nodal Pricing 
Nodal pricing is often put forward as the most efficient 
transmission pricing mechanism [1]–[4]. This system is applied 
among regions worldwide, most notably in the PJM 
interconnection, ERCOT, New York and New England markets 
in the US, New Zealand, Singapore and Russia. 
Nodal pricing, more appropriately referred to as locational 
marginal pricing (LMP), determines separate prices for each 
node of the network. Besides an energy component, these prices 
also reflect transmission constraints. The locational marginal 
price is the marginal cost of supplying the next increment of 
electric energy at a specific bus considering the generation 
marginal cost and the physical aspects of the transmission 
system [10]. Price differences between nodes reflect the cost of 
transmission [11]. When all transmission constraints are 
accurately incorporated into nodal prices, there is no need for 
corrective congestion management actions. While the 
theoretical principles of LMP are clear, practical 
implementations of nodal pricing models differ [12]. For 
example, the extent to which generators and retailers (or both) 
are subject to nodal prices, deviates. Also a financial as opposed 
to a physical approach concerning risk management to hedge 
against volatile real-time nodal prices can be identified. Finally, 
some markets, e.g. in the US, are organized with an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) who is not the transmission 
system owner. This contrasts markets with Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs) which both own and operate the 
system. As such, there exists no one predefined implementation 
of nodal pricing. 
B. Zonal Pricing 
On the other hand, not all developed electricity markets in 
the world have adopted a nodal pricing mechanism. Europe in 
particular is still operated based on a zonal configuration. 
Furthermore, a move towards nodal pricing is not foreseen in 
the near future, as the Target model put forward by ENTSO-e 
does not encompass such a consideration. Instead, an 
assessment of the efficiency of the current bidding zone 
configuration will be carried out every two years [13]. 
Under zonal pricing, individual network nodes are 
aggregated into zones which constitute uniform price areas. In 
Europe, the integration of the separate markets is done through 
market coupling, where transactions between zones are allowed 
up to a predefined Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) level2. 
The European electricity model essentially separates the energy 
and transmission market, as follows: First, TSOs determine 
appropriate ATCs between zones. Second, the energy market is 
cleared – within the limits of the ATCs – by Power Exchanges 
(PXs) which act as market operators. Afterwards, TSOs take the 
necessary corrective congestion management actions to ensure 
a safe and secure operation of the transmission network. While 
a “right ATC” can make market coupling relatively efficient 
compared to nodal pricing, selecting the right ATC is, and will 
probably remain, an unsolved issue [5]. Besides determining 
the appropriate ATCs, another option to more accurately 
                                                          
2 With the exception of the day-ahead market in Central Western 
Europe (CWE), where flow-based market coupling has replaced the 
ATC approach since May 20th 2015. 
represent the transmission network is to geographically 
redefine the actual price zones. Introducing additional price 
zones results in a more refined representation of the 
transmission grid at the market clearing stage. As such, the 
likelihood of binding transmission constraints within a zone, 
and thus the need for corrective congestion management, is 
reduced. Furthermore, smaller price zones also decrease 
uncertainty about generation and load patterns within a zone, 
allowing for a less reserved determination of ATCs [14]. The 
European Network codes on “Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management” formulated by ENTSO-e prescribe 
to define bidding zones such that they ensure efficient 
congestion management and lead to overall market efficiency. 
Moreover, the bidding zone configuration should be consistent 
across all timeframes and stable over time [13]. 
Due to market coupling, European electricity markets 
interact. Therefore, a national bidding zone reconfiguration also 
influences market outcomes in other European countries. This 
paper complements literature by analyzing to which extent 
electricity market interactions in a zonal ATC system are 
impacted by the introduction of two German price zones. 
Besides studying the altered market outcome within Germany, 
also the implications for consumers and producers in other 
European countries are investigated. 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A cost-minimizing dispatch model is applied to simulate 
market clearing in the spot market, taking into account market 
coupling across Europe under a zonal pricing approach [6]. The 
implemented model is a variation on the ELMOD model, which 
is developed at the Dresden University of Technology in order 
to analyze various questions on market design, congestion 
management and investment decisions, with a focus on 
Germany and continental Europe3 [15]. The model has 
previously been used to analyze topics concerning network 
expansion and the integration of renewables, approaches to 
incorporate network constraints into market clearing and 
coordination aspects regarding congestion management and 
dispatch [16]–[19]. 
A. Spot Market Model 
Market clearing is performed by a market operator who 
maximizes social welfare. The simple spot market model used 
in this paper abstracts from complications such as block bids 
and assumes a perfectly competitive market. Furthermore, 
perfectly inelastic demand curves per country are implemented. 
The generation cost-minimizing objective function is first of all 
subject to a general zonal power balance equation. This 
equation states that electricity generation within each zone, 
supplemented by import, must be in balance with electricity 
demand and export. Further constraints restrict renewable 
outputs per technology, impose limitations on the generation 
output for every conventional power plant and control for 
ramping rates. Ramping rates typically express flexibility as a 
percentage of the total installed capacity of a generation unit. 
Since this flexibility depends on the operating point of a power 
3 ELMOD website: www.diw.de/elmod 
 
 
plant, a distinction is made between committed and non-
committed capacity [20]. Pumped-storage hydro plants are 
represented through limitations for power release and loading, 
boundaries on the stored energy level and a description of the 
law of motion. Finally, commercial exchanges of power 
between countries are allowed up to a predefined ATC level. 
B. Input Data 
The spot market model is solved for a 2020 scenario in 53 
weekly blocks. The spatial scope of the model encompasses 36 
European countries, stretching from Portugal in the south until 
Finland in the north. Interactions between electricity markets 
are modelled using the ATC approach. ATC values are derived 
for both directions on all borders, based on historical data while 
at the same time taking into account new investments in 
interconnection capacity towards 2020. 
The German electricity market is modeled on the level of 
individual power plants [6]. This is in contrast with other 
European countries, for which only aggregate capacities per 
technology are available. Demand and renewables information 
is denoted per country and takes into account seasonal 
availability factors. For Germany in particular, this data is split 
up according to the investigated north-south breakdown (see 
also fig. 4) [6]. Annual demand in the northern zone (370TWh) 
is significantly higher than in the southern zone (173TWh). 
North-south power exchanges in both directions within 
Germany are allowed up to a defined ATC limit of 8GW [6]. 
For a 2020 scenario, in both the northern and southern zone, the 
sum of the installed renewable generation capacities is higher 
than the sum of all conventional generation capacities. This is 
mainly due to high shares of onshore wind and solar PV in the 
north, and solar PV in the south. Compared to 2015, the total 
conventional generation capacity decreases, while the installed 
renewable generation capacity is significantly increased. The 
installed onshore wind generation capacity in the north of 
Germany is expanded by at least 13GW. In 2020, some nuclear 
power plants are already shut down, as part of the planned 
nuclear phase-out in Germany towards 2022.  
IV. RESULTS 
This chapter analyzes the implications of the introduction of 
a separate northern and southern price zone in Germany. First 
of all, the modified market outcome within Germany is 
investigated. Secondly, the main flow deviations through 
Germany’s neighbouring electricity markets are studied. A final 
section discusses the impact on consumers and producers across 
Europe separately. 
A. Implications for Germany 
North-south power exchanges in Germany are driven by 
price differences between the newly introduced northern and 
southern price zone and restricted by an exchange limit. An 
ATC level of 8GW is determined for both directions between 
the two zones [6]. In case of north-south congestion, price 
differences arise. This section sequentially discusses north-
south power exchanges and price divergence within Germany. 
1) North-south Power Exchanges 
By introducing two German price zones, interactions 
between the north and south of Germany are now included in 
the market clearing step. Exchanges between the northern and 
southern price zone in Germany are represented by black bars 
in fig. 1. Positive (negative) values correspond with an 
exchange from south to north (north to south). From this figure, 
it is clear that strong north-south exchanges within Germany 
occur for a 2020 scenario. The ATC limit of 8GW for north-
south transactions is reached in 60% of the time. Furthermore, 
a seasonal effect during summer can be observed. As the 
availability of solar PV generation in the south of Germany 
increases during summer, the need for north-south 
transportation of electric energy is temporarily diminished.  
 
2) North-south Price Divergence 
Together with dominant north-south power exchanges, 
price divergence between the southern and northern German 
price zone occurs (fig. 2). The maximum instantaneous south-
north price spread equals 48,85EUR/MWh, while the weighted 
average spread for 2020 is equal to 5,16EUR/MWh. However, 
price convergence still occurs in 50% of the time. Remarkably, 
the price in the north is never higher than the price in the south 
in 2020. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: North-south (negative values) and south-north (positive 
values) exchanges in Germany 
 
Figure 2: Price duration curve [Germany 1 zone vs. Germany 2 zones] 
 
 
B. Implications for Cross-border Commercial Flows 
Due to market coupling, European electricity markets 
interact. When north-south transactions within Germany are 
restricted by an exchange limit, part of this obstructed 
commercial flow will find another path.  
Fig. 3 displays the main impacted borders. Black (grey) bars 
indicate the percentage of time power flows in the defined 
(reverse) direction. With two German price zones, German 
imports from Austria are considerably increased. Three main 
deviations towards the south of Germany via Austria can be 
distinguished (fig. 3 and 4). First of all, commercial flows from 
the Czech Republic (CZ) towards Austria (AT) occur more 
frequently (1). Secondly, also more regular exchanges from 
Slovakia (SK) to Hungary (HU) and then towards Austria take 
place (2). Finally, a new path from Hungary through Croatia 
(HR) and Slovenia (SI), eventually arriving again in Austria, 
can be identified as well (3).  
 
 
C. Implications for Consumers and Producers across Europe 
Because of market coupling, a national bidding zone 
reconfiguration influences market outcomes in other European 
countries. Since the altered cross-border commercial flows 
provide only part of the picture, this section analyzes in detail 
the implications of two German price zones for consumers and 
producers separately. 
1) Consumers 
Despite the implementation of a perfectly inelastic demand 
curve for each country, consumer surpluses can be derived by 
considering a Value of Lost Load (VOLL). As such, consumer 
surplus corresponds with the difference between the VOLL and 
the market price, multiplied by the fixed energy demand in this 
country. The change in consumer surplus when Germany 
evolves from one bidding zone towards two separate price 
zones is presented in fig. 5. Mainly consumers in the north of 
Germany are better off. However, a positive impact on 
consumer surplus is also noticeable for Sweden, Norway and 
Poland. On the other hand, primarily consumers in the South of 
Germany, as well as French and Austrian consumers, are worse 
off. Overall, consumers in Germany benefit from two German 
price zones, as the positive impact on consumers in the north 
(+783 million EUR) outweighs the decrease in consumer 
surplus for the southern region (-527 million EUR).  
 
2) Producers 
Fig. 6 displays the change in producer surplus per country 
when Germany evolves from one bidding zone to two separate 
price zones. Producer surplus is defined as the sum of the 
differences between the market price paid for a unit of energy 
and the marginal cost to produce this unit. Producer surplus is 
crucially influenced by the amount of electric energy that is 
generated locally. Local generation is determined by domestic 
energy demand, augmented by net exports. Main increases in 
producer surplus take place in the south of Germany, France 
and Austria. In contrast, producer surplus is reduced drastically 
in the north of Germany, but also in Sweden and Norway. In 
total, German producers are worse off with two German price 
zones, as producer surplus decreases by 1030 million EUR in 
the north, while an increase of only 438 million EUR occurs in 
the south. 
 
Figure 3: Main impacted cross-border commercial flows [Germany 1 
zone (1z)  vs. Germany 2 zones (2z)] 
 
Figure 4: Main commercial flow deviations when Germany evolves to 
two price zones 
 
Figure 5: Change in consumer surplus when Germany evolves to two 
price zones (absolute change > 45 million EUR)
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Faced with north-south congestion, Germany investigates 
the option of a national bidding zone reconfiguration. The 
German transmission network is better represented in the 
market clearing step when a separate northern and southern 
price zone exist. By imposing a limit on north-south 
transactions during market clearing, less redispatch actions are 
required afterwards. 
However, through market coupling, a national bidding zone 
reconfiguration impacts other European electricity markets as 
well. This paper shows that such a market design change should 
be analyzed in a European wide context. First of all, a limitation 
on transactions from north to south within Germany results in a 
deviation of commercial flows through neighbouring countries 
located south-east of Germany. Furthermore, consumers and 
producers across European countries are impacted. Within 
Germany, consumers are better off with two price zones, while 
the producers lose. Interestingly, considerable changes in 
consumer and producer surpluses for Germany’s neighbouring 
countries can be observed as well. 
Nevertheless, to decide on the desirability of two separate 
German price zones it is necessary to perform a global welfare 
analysis. First of all, the reduction in redispatch cost within 
Germany has to be quantified. Moreover, the overall change in 
congestion rent should be taken into account. Congestion rent, 
calculated as the sum of the price differences between zones 
multiplied by the commercial flow between the zones, is an 
ownerless income collected by the market operator and 
contributes to the overall social welfare.  
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Figure 6: Change in producer surplus when Germany evolves to two 
price zones (absolute change > 40 million EUR) 
